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Empty Souls: Confession and Forgiveness
in Hegel and Dostoevsky
Ryan Johnson
“Spirit is this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself…”
—Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit

The Haymarket
“Towards the end of a sultry afternoon early in July a young man came out of his little
room in Stolyarny Lane and turned and in the direction of Kameny Bridge in central St.
Petersburg.”1 Right then, this young man, a former law student named Rodion
Raskolnikov, is caught in an agonizing conversation with himself over whether or not
to commit the ultimate crime: to murder an innocent person. Exasperated, wondering
what to do with such a weighty decision, he cried aloud, “that’s why I don’t act, because
I am always talking. Or perhaps I talk so much just because I can’t act.”2 On this
occasion, he decided not to actualize his thoughts, and so kept on pondering. A little
later, as he wandered through the dusty streets of the lively St. Petersburg public
market, the young man again relapses into contemplation of the character of his
existence, its worth, and its meaning. If he ever did decide to commit such evil, the act
would determine what kind of man he is. It is a question of the movement from thought
to action.
In order to sort out these competing thoughts and the possible meanings of
Raskolnikov’s character, I turn to the Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.3 On a Hegelian
reading, the contemplative young man is caught dithering amongst three types of
“self”: (1) self as “legal person,” (2) self as “moral consciousness,” and (3) self as
“conscience.” Each type of self is identified by means of a problematic relation between
the individual and the universal. The first two types fail to properly make such a relation
harmonize, and the third form is the culmination of the failures of the first two.
Without reducing him with any one of these types of self, situating Raskolnikov’s
contemplation in Hegel’s Dialectic of Conscience illuminates the psychological and
philosophical complexities of Dostoevsky’s character. Let’s look at the three selves and
how they negotiate the individual-universal relationship.
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(1) Legal Person. Until a few months prior, Raskolnikov had been attending law
classes at the University, hoping to become what Hegel calls a “legal person” (Selbst der
Person).4 Such a self is legal in the sense that law, legality as a system of explicitly
defined laws, exists beyond, yet applies to, every individual citizen. Just as a law (an
abstract universal) is applied to a concrete deed (a particular), a legal person is an
abstract universal category that is applied to concrete individuals. To be a legal person,
then, an individual must be identified as a general type of person, a student, a
policeman, a pawnbroker, etc. This is the case when say, other people recognize
Raskolnikov as only a law student, nothing more than that.5 Everything else that he may
be – e.g., a violinist, a brother, a cook, etc. – is overlooked, thereby rendering him
“devoid of substance…an abstract reality.”

6

There is nothing more to being a legal

person than merely counting as a particular example of general kind of person. Who is
he? Oh, he is just a law student, nothing more than that. There is thus a schism
between the individuality of Raskolnikov and the universal category that is supposed to
define him.
(2) Moral Consciousness. Before long, Raskolnikov finds himself in the antechamber
of the apartment of Alena Ivanova, an elderly pawnbroker. He first identifies himself by
proclaiming his legal personhood: “I am Raskolnikov, a student, I was here a month
ago.”7 The old woman remembers him, but not merely as a law student. To her, he is
more than that; he is obliged to fulfill a promise: to pay his debt. Since she was always
suspicious of him, she now sees through that empty shell, beyond being merely law
student. Hegel would say that she sees him as a “self of moral consciousness.” 8 Unlike
the self qua law student, the self qua moral consciousness prevents reducing someone
to a general kind of person. Moral consciousness brings with it a new form of relation
between individual and universal: the individual takes as “object and content of the
self” the universal law beyond.9 Rather than being simply defined as “law student,”
Raskolnikov, as a moral consciousness, aims to fulfill the imperative of the moral law.
In sum, there are two different and inverted relationships between universal and
individual in these two forms of self: a legal person moves from universal to individual,
while a moral consciousness moves from individual to universal. Put differently, a moral
consciousness is defined by the duty to fulfill the law, and this is more a “striving to
fulfill” than a “being defined by.”
Now that his debt was two days overdue, it was time Raskolnikov paid it back and
thus held up his side of the contract on which he and the pawnbroker had previously
agreed. And yet, even this duty is too abstract. For although Raskolnikov had
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committed himself to repay his debt, he does not do so. Instead, he remains caught in
“an insincere play of alternating between these two determinations”—whether to repay
the debt or to escape it through a violent crime.10 In this way, the contract that they had
both agreed to fulfill does not recognize who each of them is beyond their respective
duties to fulfill it: to the pawnbroker, Raskolnikov is just a debtor; to him, she is merely
his creditor. Thus, in moral consciousness, there is a schism between individual
(Raskolnikov and the pawnbroker) and universal (the contract).
(3) Conscience. Conscience (Gewissen), the third form of self, is the reconciliation of
the schism between individual and universal that legal personhood and moral
consciousness fail to overcome. In conscience, individual and universal coincide. Being
neither an empty legal person nor a duty-bound moral self, the conscience emerges
through concrete action. Unlike the legal person, wherein the general type “law student”
fails to account for the specificity of Raskolnikov’s individuality, conscience indicates a
type of person who acts.11 Conscience determines what it means to be a law student not
merely through words but through real action. Unlike the moral self, wherein
Raskolnikov’s duty to repay his debt is fulfilled, conscience is the actual carrying out of
duty. In short, the problem of the two previous forms of self (legal person and moral
consciousness) is that they are not able to overcome the schism between universality
and individuality, abstraction and concretion, possibility and actuality. In conscience,
by contrast, the members of a real community all recognize each other’s actual
individuality through what I will later call “conscientious forgiveness.” This diagram
may help clarify the different forms of relationship between individuality and
universality in the three types of self:
Legal Person: Universal (law student)  individual (Raskolnikov)
Moral Consciousness: Universal (contract)  individual (Raskolnikov & pawnbroker)
Conscience: Universal  individual = Concrete action
As we will soon see, conscience is not the end of the story. In Crime and Punishment,
Raskolnikov’s gratuitous act provokes a twisted tale of hatred, evil, confession, and
forgiveness that gathers together other acting individuals so as to form a community.
Starting from the various ways of addressing the schism between individual and
universal that we see embodied by the three forms of self in Hegel’s Dialectic of
Conscience, we can now begin to situate the way in which the schism is not actually
overcome by Raskolnikov’s act but is instead perpetuated by it.
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The Hatred and the Act
While drinking tea at a tired old tavern, Raskolnikov stumbled upon an idea, “a strange
idea [that] seemed to be pecking away in his head, like a chicken emerging from the
shell.”12 While the idea was still in its embryonic stage, he overheard a conversation
between a student and a young officer about Alena Ivanovna, the pawnbroker he had
just visited. Although the coincidence occurred at the merest of chances, the effect was
quite extraordinary. Raskolnikov listened intently. As expected, the two had nothing
good to say about the wary old widow. In fact, the students’ spiteful words betrayed the
coldest and most utilitarian of probing questions: “don’t you think that thousands of
good deeds will wipe out one little, insignificant transgression...why, it’s simple
arithmetic! What is the life of that stupid, spiteful, consumptive old woman weighed
against the common good?”13 After lingering over these moral queries for a bit, the
student makes a most pressing observation, one that particularly piques Raskolnikov’s
interest. “I swear I could kill that damned old woman and rob her, without a single
twinge of conscience.”14 This leads Raskolnikov to pose such a question to himself: “Can
I,” he thinks, “really be capable of that? Am I really serious?”15
At just this moment we see, in the mind of Raskolnikov, the coincidence of the first
two selves, mere inversions of each other. On the one hand, the first self as legal
person, wherein the individual is defined abstractly through its membership in a
community, is sacrificed to the greater good. On the other hand, the second self of
moral conscience, defined by the individual’s duty to fulfill the moral law, sacrifices the
moral law because it can never be enacted. Later we will see that it might not have been
a mere coincidence that Raskolnikov was listening “at this particular moment to that
particular talk and those particular ideas when there had just been born in his own
brain exactly the same ideas?”16 Such thoughts continue to haunt him long after that
fateful night at the tavern.
After sleeping for almost an entire day, Raskolnikov awoke to the shudder of the
same dialectical machinery whirring away in his mind. Amidst the height of the
“feverish bustle” of this depraved economy, all other duties—duties to family, to the
pawnbroker, to the university, to the law, etc.—were silenced by an emergent
conviction.17 At first unbeknownst to him, it “had somehow come about that the whole
project had been analyzed and finally decided down to the last detail, and no further
doubts remained…he had convinced himself.”18 This is the emergence of the self as
conscience, that is, “simple action …which fulfills not this or that duty, but knows and
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does what is concretely right.”19 Now convinced, Raskolnikov begins to enact the plan.
First, he sews the loop in his tattered jacket so he can conceal the murder weapon, an
axe he stole from his landlady; then he concocts a fake “pledge” of money; finally, at
seven-thirty that night, only an hour-and-a-half after his conviction has crystallized,
he finds himself grasping the pull-string of the door-bell of the rotten pawnbroker.
Raskolnikov knows his purpose, and he has the absolute conviction that he must act
according to his duty.
Let’s pause here and ask a question: How did Raskolnikov come to decide and act
with such conviction? As Hegel puts it, “just this knowing as its own knowing, as
conviction [Überzeugung], is duty [Pflicht].”20 While the second self, the abstract and
empty moral consciousness, could not reach that point of conviction, and thus could
not act but remains caught between the purity of acting and talking, Raskolnikov acts.
Acting conscientiously, he conforms to his own individual duty in order to be himself.
Here we see Hegel’s definition of conscience—the inner conviction by which duty
defines the self—operating in Crime and Punishment.21 Raskolnikov’s duty to kill the old
woman derives from his conviction that he should do so. Acting according to his
conscience, Raskolnikov identifies himself immediately with what he takes to be his
duty. In this way, acting is a process of self-making. What it means to be a self-prior-toacting and the actual existence of the self-having-acted are perfectly united, which also
means that the particular and the universal are equally united. “It is now that the law
exists for the sake of the self, not the self that exists for the sake of action…The action
is thus only the translation of [Raskolnikov’s] individual content into the object[ive]
element.”22 By killing the old woman, Raskolnikov’s conviction, his duty, and his
subjectivity attain “standing and real existence.”23 The abstractness of duty (of moral
consciousness) is lost, or perhaps it is made concrete through the actualization of one
man’s conviction that he is doing the right thing, exactly as he should.
Although Raskolnikov knows he is acting rightly, he is aware that “reality is a
plurality of circumstances which breaks up and spreads out endlessly in all directions,
backwards into their conditions, sideways into their connections, forwards in their
consequences.”24 This is an inherent feature of conscience: admitting that moral
knowledge is incomplete and fallible means that action, since it is based only on its
knowledge, is also fallible. Despite such contingency, “this incomplete knowledge is
held by the conscientious mind to be sufficient and complete, because it is its own
knowledge.”25 Unlike Kantian morality, in which the moral act can never be
conclusively decided, acting conscientiously exhausts duty.26 There is no danger of
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disjunction between duty and act. Although he is only one man, although his
knowledge is incomplete, Raskolnikov knows with complete self-certainty that he has
performed his duty.
When Raskolnikov was eavesdropping at the tavern, we might have assumed that
he acted because the “general good is to be preferred to action for the good of the
individual.”27 Yet such reasoning derives from a purely formal law, and is thus abstract
and empty. To act from conscience, by contrast, as Raskolnikov did, is to act according
to a law “from which conscience knows itself to be absolutely free, and [to] give
[himself] authority to add to and take from, to neglect as well as fulfill it.” 28 This
seeming tension between universal and individual, however, is premised upon the
reciprocal interplay between individual and community. “The truth is rather that what
the individual does for himself also contributes to the general good.”29 That is, the
individual lives and acts in direct contact with others. This is why trying to act
according to a pure duty or formal law, by “calculating and weighing duties,” actually
delays or even prevents action.30 Acting as a conscientious individual, Raskolnikov
makes his own decision without recourse to any universal law. This means that nothing
can count as a reason for action unless one takes it as one’s own, as one’s reason and
purpose. Raskolnikov is thus the epitome of what Hegel calls “the self-assured Spirit.”31
The source of his action is self-imposed. He acts with “the validity of law.”32 In terms of
conscience, then, a law acquires legislative force only if it is self-legislative. This is the
right of subjectivity. As Hegel puts it, “in the strength of [his] own self-assurance [he]
possesses the majesty of absolute autarchy [absoluten Autarkie].”33 That Raskolnikov
took the murder of the pawnbroker as his duty is thus what makes it his duty.34
From Evil to Language
This does not, however, mean that just because Raskolnikov acted according to selflegislation, he is beyond reproach. The idea that the moral worth of an act is based on
its intention reveals one of the greatest dangers with purely formal and intentionbased moralities. In Kantian morality, for example, to say that an act is morally
praiseworthy if it is based on a good intention, if it corresponds to the moral law, is to
disregard its actual consequences.35 Such a morality, Hegel reveals, misses something
important about duty and action. In Crime and Punishment, even if Raskolnikov intends
to do good, at a certain point the consequences matter. If his killing of the pawnbroker
sets him on an endless killing spree, and even if always he “intends” to do good, we
would still reproach him for his actions. This reveals one of the advantages of
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conscience over moral consciousness: conscience evaluates both the intention and the
consequences of actions. While others might recognize that Raskolnikov acted
conscientiously, the consequences of his action are still susceptible to judgment.
Although Raskolnikov is absolutely certain of his self-imposed duty, once that duty is
fulfilled or actualized, his action exceeds his identity. Why? Because the action, like all
action, has unforeseeable consequences that retroactively determine the action in
some way or other. That is, the action is held up for others to freely evaluate the action
in terms of the ways in which it affects the community. “Both sides, the conscience that
acts and the universal consciousness that acknowledges this action as duty, are equally
free from the specificity of this action.”36 Despite his clear conviction, which is based on
certain though incomplete knowledge, his hands are not perfectly clean. This reveals
the failure of conscience: firm conviction or intention does not entail the rightness of
an act. And this is why conscience requires a further set of categories, i.e., evil,
remorse, guilt, and regret, as well as categories of crime, confession, punishment,
forgiveness, and reconciliation. Thus, despite his conviction, his action, like all human
action, is instable.
“Others, therefore, do not know whether this conscience is morally good or evil
[böse].”37 Other people must be free to consider the action in order to judge it. Equally
so, Raskolnikov must freely consider the action, albeit from the opposite perspective:
not in order to judge, but in order to justify his action. He must stand forth, before the
community, and claim the action as his own. The essence of the action is thus both foroneself and for-another, in-itself and for-us. This is why it is possible for others to
simultaneously agree that Raskolnikov acted conscientiously, and yet disagree about
the best interpretation of the content. In short, although he is the author of his action,
and others recognize him as the author, he does not have authority over the meanings
of his deed.
What is needed, then, is a “common medium [allgemeine Medium] of their
connection,” something that brings the individuals into a moral community:
language.38 “Language [Sprache],” Hegel claims, “is self-consciousness existing for
others” and for itself.39 Through language, Raskolnikov becomes directly present to
others and to himself. Although language is operative in any form of self, language
acquires a new dimension in conscience that distinguishes it from the two other forms
of self: legal person and moral consciousness. While the legal person can only speak in
abstract “law and simple command,” and moral consciousness, lacking any concrete
language at all, remains mute and dumb, in conscience, “[l]anguage, however, emerges
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as the middle term.”

40

Through language, conscience is able to explain publicly its

account of why it acted. That is, the language at play in the legal and moral selves lacks
performative articulation that could “fit” Raskolnikov’s individual, concrete deed. Or,
legal or moral language fails to reconcile universal and normative demands with a
particular deed. In conscience, though, the individual actor articulates what he takes to
be the meaning of his deed to an actual community that can accept or reject said
meaning. The resolute conviction that Raskolnikov took as his self-legislated duty thus
becomes meaningful through linguistic pronouncement [Aussprachen]. In language, the
“distinction between the universal consciousness and the individual self is just what
has been superseded, and the supersession of it is conscience.”41 Raskolnikov, and
everyone else who stands witness to this declaration, thus mutually acknowledge each
other as conscientious selves.
The Schism that is Raskolnikov
In Crime and Punishment, however, this is not exactly how things unfold. While the first
part of the text depicts the events leading up to the crime and the crime itself, the
remaining parts detail the punishment that follow the criminal act. After killing the
pawnbroker and her hapless sister, Raskolnikov is caught in the throes of near delirium.
He acted, thereby fulfilling what he understood as his duty, and thus defined himself as
a murderer. Yet the action is not recognized as his action, which is why he is not yet
identified with the act. Once the mortal act is finished, although the wretched widows
are dead, the deed lives on insofar as it becomes possible to interpret the deed a variety
of ways. The deed thus has life beyond the supposed fait accompli. In this way,
Raskolnikov loses the moral certainty and moral identity that he was previously
convinced he possessed. The rest of the text then occurs in this space between: on the
one hand, fulfillment of the fatal fact in the vile act, and on the other hand, the
declaration of his conviction, through the form of a confession, to the public. Like his
namesake, Raskolnikov is split.42 The axe with which he killed the deplorable sisters
cleaves apart his own soul, creating a schism that continues to split until, finally, he
confesses and his deed is recognized. This schism opens just a day after Raskolnikov
commits the deed. He is at the police station for an unrelated summons. Sitting in the
station, he overhears a recounting of his own crime, and two contradictory desires
unfurl in Raskolnikov’s soul: the desire to confess and be forgiven and the desire to
maintain his freedom. Caught in this tension, Raskolnikov loses consciousness and
collapses onto the floor.
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Both of these competing desires correspond to moments in Hegel’s story. On the
one hand, there is the desire to remain out of jail. In this case, Raskolnikov, “in the
majesty of [his] elevation above specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever
content [he] pleases into [his] knowing and willing. [He] is the moral genius.”43 This is
the first sign of his punishment. Since he can define himself in whatever way he
chooses, without corroborative recognition from the community, he begins to feel more
and more estranged from the rest of humanity. Since the community does not confirm
or deny what he takes himself to be, any definition of himself is ephemeral. He loses his
connection to other people, and so retracts into his own head, where he hears a single
voice that repeats the same words over and over, as if he was the only one to whom god
spoke. He does not respond to the call of others, but only to the divine imperative
within. Calling this a moment of “solitary divine worship,” Hegel claims this “moral
genius knows the inner voice of what [he] immediately knows to be a divine voice.”44 To
the unsuspecting outside world, Raskolnikov seems like a pitiable victim of bad health
and unfortunate circumstances. Yet this very misrecognition, this failure to identify the
person with his act, drives the wedge further into Raskolnikov’s soul, and increases the
burning desire to confess and to declare himself in front of his ingenuous friends and
family. Failure to reconcile the person and the act means that, while the act may still be
considered criminal, the person who acted lacks such definition, and so lacks
meaningful existence. What it means for Raskolnikov to be an actual person requires
that others recognize his actions as his actions. On the other hand, Raskolnikov also
wants to confess, so much so that his desire becomes a gnawing obsession, and so
starts to affect his physical demeanor. Although others do not recognize his true self,
they notice that he is consumed by an inner struggle. As Hegel says of conscience,
Raskolnikov “is divided into the antithesis of [him]self and [his] object which is, for
[him], essence; but it is just this object that is perfectly transparent, is [his] own self,
and [his] consciousness is only this knowledge of [him]self.”45 Razumikhin,
Raskolnikov’s university friend, notices this schism within Raskolnikov when he says,
“it is as if he had two separate personalities, each dominating him alternately.” 46
Raskolnikov withdraws both into and away from himself in that he chooses to
follow the first of these desires, the desire to escape incarceration. In order to maintain
his freedom, he must eradicate the heart-wrenching gap. Only by erasing his guilt will
he prevent himself from unwittingly confessing. The first attempt to remove evidence
of his guilt is to hide the stolen goods. Raskolnikov finds an inconspicuous stone
resting in an empty courtyard and does his best to conceal the lucre. Unlike the stolen
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goods, however, the desire to confess is not so easily secreted underneath the little
stone, as the competing desires become “extreme abstractions, none of which endures
but each of which loses itself in the other and produces it.” 47 At one point in the story,
Raskolnikov returns to the scene of the crime and angrily asks two workers why they
removed all the blood. At another point, while talking to the police inspector
Zamyotov, he basically confesses, albeit under a sardonic guise. Slowly but surely, he
lets enough hints of his guilt slip out in seemingly innocuous conversation that the
alert and perceptive Porfiry Petrovich, the acting magistrate, begins to suspect him.
Despite these semi-camouflaged acts of self-destruction, despite trying to redeem
himself through altruistic acts, such as giving the family of the dead drunkard
Marmeladov twenty rubles, the madness of his repressed guilt eventually returns.
A Complex Web of Duties, Deeds, and Declarations
Amidst this increasingly forceful Dialectic of Conscience, language comes on the scene
in a most interesting way. After agreeing to go to the funeral of the drunken
Marmeladov, Raskolnikov and Razumikhin visit the home of Porfiry Petrovich, who,
along with sweet Sonya, later convinces Raskolnikov to confess his crime. After some
conversation, the progressively apprehensive Raskolnikov suspects that Porfiry already
recognizes him as the true perpetrator of the two murders. At the height of
Raskolnikov’s suspicion on this visit, just before he is about to confess the crime,
Porfiry mentions an article that Raskolnikov had written, which, without Raskolnikov’s
knowing, had been published two months prior. The article, entitled “Concerning
Crime,” surveyed “the psychological condition of a crime throughout the commission
of the crime.”48 The main topic of their discussion of the article is a justification for the
deed that Raskolnikov would later commit.
The article details two types of men: ordinary men and extraordinary men. 49 While
ordinary men must follow the moral codes governing a particular culture, extraordinary
men, such as Napoleon or Newton, are not subject to such standard. Because of this
difference, “[o]rdinary ones must live in submission and have no right to transgress the
laws, because, you see, they are ordinary. And the extraordinary have the right to
commit any crime and break every kind of law just because they are extraordinary.”50
This is not to say that the extraordinary man has a “formal, official, right, but he has
the right in himself, to permit his conscience to overstep…certain obstacles, but only in
the event that his ideas…require it for their fulfillment.”51 Raskolnikov, like Hegel, even
claims that all the “law-givers and regulators of human society…were without
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exception transgressors.”52 Thus, Raskolnikov, through the uncontrollable force of
language, confesses his crime without actually confessing, a confession in excess of
itself.
This point in the text is especially interesting because Porphiry, Razumikihn, and
Zamyotov form the beginnings of a community of mutually acknowledging selves
simultaneously caught in what might be called a closed linguistic feedback loop.
Consider the structure of the scene. In the presence of the very detective who will
eventually elicit his confession, Raskolnikov announces the justification for his crimes.
He pronounces the confession without confessing, the justification without the crime,
the understanding but not the act. Moreover, Raskolnikov commits the murder after his
own article has publicly announced (granted, unbeknownst to him) the justification for
the act. To put it in Hegelese, the article/confession was written for himself, sent out
for publication for others, yet it was published in itself (or without the author’s
knowledge) for us, and was eventually received, by the author, as existing in and for
itself. It is at this point that language, the “common medium of their connection,”
seems thickest. The article assumes a life of its own. At the time of its publication,
however, it referred to a future act that was only later actualized. In the end, the
community of moral judges is caught amidst competing interpretations of this complex
web of duties, deeds, and declarations.
It should now be clear that morality is quite insecure. No moral deed is done. No
moral certainty is grounded. Something uncontrollable always lingers on. For example,
after returning to his apartment Raskolnikov learns that a stranger had come to his
room and asked for him while he was at the detective’s house. Catching up to the
stranger on the street, the man mysteriously calls Raskolnikov a “‘murderer!’...in a low
but distinct voice.”53 Interestingly, Raskolnikov does not deny the deed. The tiny
community of moral judges, although not yet determinate, is quickly growing. Later
that same night, he dreams of killing the pawnbroker for a second time. This time,
however, she does not die but simply laughs at him as he wildly swings his axe,
mocking his own deed. Through this laughter, Raskolnikov is stripped bare, left
helpless, unable to define himself independently of the recognition of others. Thus, his
“activity is a yearning which merely loses [him]self as consciousness, becomes an
object devoid of substance, and, rising above this loss, and falling back on [him]self,
finds [him]self only as a lost soul.”54
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The Unavoidability of Evil
After securing care and protection for his distraught mother, Pulkheria Alexandrovna,
and her unfortunate sister, Dunya, Raskolnikov, although not explicitly, decides to
confess. While he still acts as if he wishes to remain free and conceal his guilt a while
longer, he continues to set up what will become the members of his moral community.
This is the membership of the community thus far:
1)

Razumikhin, his friend with whom “some idea, something like a hint,
something terrible and monstrous, was suddenly understood on both
sides.”

2)

Sonya, the prostitute and daughter of the dead drunkard Marmeladov and
the girl he eventual comes to love, the first one to receive his confession.

3)

Svidrigailov, the widower and spurned admirer of Raskolnikov’s sister
Dunya, who surreptitiously learns of the crime while listening in on
Raskolnikov’s confession from the room adjacent to Sonya’s.

4)

Porfiry, the clever investigating magistrate, who knows the author of the
crime early on and slowly deploys psychological tricks in order to elicit
Raskolnikov’s confession.

With the community established, Raskolnikov is nearly ready to confess. And yet, his
confession is delayed. Just when Raskolnikov is closest to conceding his crime to
Porfiry, Nikolai, the painter who was held under suspicion of the murder of the two
forsaken sisters, bursts into the room and claims responsibility. Porfiry, however, does
not really believe Nikolai’s confession and eventually determines the true culprit before
he even confesses.
What we see here is that conscience not only needs a particular type of language, it
also needs a particular type of community. It needs a complex moral community that
allows for acknowledgement, approval, judgment, forgiveness, etc. The need for
external expression of Raskolnikov’s conviction means that conscience is not wholly
withdrawn, not solely in the head. Conscience is not simply a little voice that only
Raskolnikov can hear. Conscience is a voice that desires to be voiced, a claim that pushes to
be declaimed, a call that strives to be publically recalled. This is not to say that each self
does not have a nagging voice in the head, but merely to say that those little voices do
not legitimately count in the greater community.
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Such a community must not, however, be merely a self-congratulatory society in
which all actions are approved simply because they are conscientious. The shortcoming
of such a complacent community is a failure of recognition: since every act in such a
nonjudgmental community is pre-approved, this community cannot recognize
significant action; it cannot recognize transgression. In Crime and Punishment, by
contrast, the community slowly forming around the figure of Raskolnikov is what we
might call a “recognitive” community.55 This is a community that, for example,
recognizes that Napoleon transgressed treaties and that Caesar committed atrocious
deeds. And despite that, or even for that very reason, a recognitive community
acknowledges such transgressions as actions taken for the sake of justice. The unjust
acts of these extraordinary men oppose present justice in the name of new justice—a
justice-to-come. Yet in order for such acts to count as significant acts, there must be a
community to recognize them as significant. This is why Raskolnikov’s need for the
kind of community to which he can confess grows stronger throughout the story. As he
wrote in his article and then defended against Porfiry, he needs to know whether or not
he is an ordinary or an extraordinary man, and the only way to do that, he is convinced,
is to act and be recognized by others as the actor. As he says, “I wanted to make myself
a Napoleon, and that is why I killed her.”56 Hegel agrees with this assessment, although
he radicalizes it even further. For Hegel, every significant act is a transgression.
Consider, for example, the figures he most often mentions—Antigone, Caesar,
Napoleon, etc. They are all transgressive individuals, whose transgressions announce a
justice-to-come.
The necessity of confessing to a recognitive community is both an affirmation of
immanently produced universals and a denial of transcendent universal norms. In this
way, universals are no longer ahistorical and atemporal, as they were with legal persons
and moral consciousness, but arise only through individual action. This is why laws and
norms are distinctly historical, temporally and spatially particular. With confession, the
will (Willkür) that Raskolnikov asserts through his act is not a denial of the deed, not a
claim to goodness, but a particular confession of a particular evil. Even more so, this
confession means that both the observers forming the community and the community
itself are equally particular. No one is above the utter particularity of the community.
Each simply asserts his own respective will, conviction, or duty against another. In
sum, Raskolnikov “admits, in fact, to being evil by asserting that [he] acts, in
opposition to the acknowledged universal, according to [his] own inner law and
conscience.”57 To be evil, then, is what it means to be a subject, be a finite self acting
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according to one’s own law as opposed to another’s law. The self and the other, then, are
equally evil and opposed. Hegel says as much: “in speaking of the conscientiousness of
[his] action, [he] may well be aware of [his] pure self, but in the purpose of [his] action, a
purpose with an actual content, [he] is aware of [him]self as this particular individual,
and is conscious of the antithesis between what [he] is for [him]self and what [he] is for
others.”58
As Raskolnikov asserts his finite subjectivity, his evil, Porfiry et al. assert their own
subjectivities in opposition to the guilty party. Both judger and actor, as finite subjects,
are evil. In fact, any significant action is now considered evil because the expression of
any subject’s will is always opposed to another’s will. Finitude, transgression,
subjectivity, negation, evil—these are all basically synonymous. Evil, thus, cannot be
avoided anymore than subjectivity can be avoided. Raskolnikov’s confession of evil did
not exclude him from the community but was instead an affirmation of the actuality of
human subjectivity. To be a member of a community is then to share in a moment of
being evil. This, in short, is the meaning of conscience.
Unfortunately for Raskolnikov, although he confessed his crime (and in doing so
demonstrated not only the evil that constitutes his self but also the evil in the judges
who constitute his community), the judges did not simply forgive and forget. 59 The
status of the community is again rendered unstable.
An Unforgiveable Act
The instability of confession leads to the instability of forgiveness. Once Raskolnikov
confesses, we might expect forgiveness to follow immediately, almost like the
determinate effect of a specific cause. Raskolnikov, in Hegel’s words, “confesses to this
other, and equally expects that the other, having in fact put himself on the same level,
will also respond in words in which he will give utterance to this identity with him, and
expects that this mutual recognition will now exist in fact.”60 Yet things are not so easy.
“[T]he confession of the one who is wicked, ‘I am so,’ is not followed by a reciprocal
similar confession.”61
Although Raskolnikov admits his guilt, Porfiry does not really want the confession,
for he was already certain of Raskolnikov’s guilt. In fact, Porfiry is the one who told
Raskolnikov he was guilty in the first place. While visiting Raskolnikov one day, Porfiry,
after twice confidently accusing him of murder, expresses his lack of interest in
Raskolnikov’s confession. Porfiry comments, “Confess, or don’t confess – its all the
same to me now. I am convinced in my own mind, without that.”62 Porfiry, the judging
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consciousness, has no intention of identifying with the criminal. As his judge, Porfiry
embodies the “hard heart [da harte Herz]” of the “beautiful soul” who “rejects any
continuity with the other.”63 He stands firm in his opposition and difference from the
criminal, refusing identification and reconciliation. As we will see, the confession is
actually the emptying of subjectivity, for the confessor and the judger. While such a
response might initially seem severe, Porfiry’s hardness of heart is not necessarily
morally wrong.
Consider the expectations contained in confession. When Raskolnikov confesses,
he, in a way, attempts to cleanse himself by submitting to the power of the dialectic of
the two antithetical desires—the desire for freedom and the desire to confess. This
might seem to imply that the logic of confession contains a certain natural calculus:
confession entails forgiveness. The assumption of such a natural law explains why a
confessor feels he deserves forgiveness. Raskolnikov openly recognizes his act as evil,
and he might expect others to do the same and allow him to start over with a clean
slate, so to speak. The confessor might think, “I am evil, but so are you. Thus, we are all
guilty.” The narrator describes how Raskolnikov’s subsequent reaction to the guilty
verdict shows that he does not view himself as more guilty than anyone else. “Although
he judged himself severely,” the narrator comments, “his lively conscience could find
no particularly terrible guilt in his past except a simple blunder that might have
happened to anybody.”64 Raskolnikov did not consider himself guilty of anything worse
than a simple gaffe. Thus some questions remain: is confession equivalent to
exculpation? Whence the demand to truly forgive and forget? Even if he confesses, can
the community justifiably forgive Raskolnikov? Or are some things truly unforgiveable?
Raskolnikov thinks that his “confession is not an abasement, a humiliation, a
throwing-away of himself in relation to the other.”65 To him, the confession is not
supposed to be completely self-effacing. He still holds out the hope that he might be
placed in the league of extraordinary men. Thus, despite confessing, Raskolnikov
retains the belief in his independence until the very last scene of the book, when he is
finally emptied of his subjectivity and recognizes his utter dependence on recognition
from the others. Contrary to his expectations, however, that is exactly what a
confession is: a confession is an act of self-effacement, a throwing away of the self. To
confess is to strip away the last remaining tatters of autonomy, to tear apart every
shred of selfdom, to reveal one’s impotence in front of others. Once he is stripped bare,
Raskolnikov reveals his complete dependence on others for his own subjectivity. No
law, no universal, no norm can ground his demand that others recognize him as the self
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he wants to become. While he tried to make himself into an extraordinary man, one of
those rare individuals raised above the rabble, he can only be such a self if others
recognize him as that self. Thus, the crime that he commits is merely a way of testing
himself, an unjustified demand that others give him the recognition he needs in order
to become an extraordinary man. Since others do not recognize him as extraordinary,
he discovers that he is nothing more than an ordinary man, a petty criminal. In this
way, his confession reveals his hopelessness and impotence. Confession empties one’s
subjectivity so as to reveal only lack—a lack of power, a lack of selfhood, empty
negativity. By confessing, Raskolnikov sets the sullen emptiness that is his subjectivity
at the feet of the other, pleading for recognition. In a strange way, requesting
forgiveness might prevent it.
The Impossibility of Forgiveness
Although the chapter on conscience in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit ostensibly ends
with forgiveness and reconciliation, the story of Raskolnikov puts the very possibility of
such an ending in question. We may still ask some questions. Is forgiveness truly
possible? Is anything truly unforgiveable? Thinking in terms of Crime and Punishment,
is it possible to forgive, say, a murder? While Porfiry, Sonya, and the rest of his moral
community of judging consciousnesses do seem to forgive Raskolnikov, a return to
equilibrium and reconciliation seems, at least initially, impossible. In order to answer
these questions, consider the importance of recognition in the structure of
reconciliation.
In reconciliation, the victim in a crime must receive the culprit’s confession. In
Crime and Punishment, this would mean that the late pawnbroker and her sister would
have to witness Raskolnikov’s admission of guilt. “The reconciling Yea,” Hegel says, “in
which the two ‘I’s’ let go their antithetical existence, is the existence of the ‘I’ which has
expanded into a duality, and therein remains identical with itself, and, in its complete
externalization and opposite, possesses the certainty of itself.”66 Yet the two victims
are dead and thus unable to receive the confession. 67 This would mean that the hope of
reconciliation through forgiveness is stilted, reduced to a necessary yet impossible act.
The two parties cannot reconcile because one party no longer exists. The living cannot
identify with the dead. Since this “reciprocal recognition” is itself “absolute Spirit,” the
coming community seems lost before it is formed.68 Since the departed women do not
take the stand when called by the act of confession, they are not able to return to the
community. To forgive seems to imply a gift and a giving, a giving of pardon, a
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complete bestowment of mercy; but if the giver is not there to give, the gift cannot be
sent or received.69 Through this irremediable and irrecoverable loss, forgiveness would
be held in abeyance. Reconciliation would be indefinitely deferred.
That being said, the impossibility of receiving forgiveness might not actually
prevent its actualization. Since forgiveness is not an economy at equilibrium, guilt and
forgiveness are not simply goods that can be exchanged depending on the agreement of
contributing parties. To put it paradoxically, the impossibility of forgiveness makes
forgiveness possible.70 Once Raskolnikov is emptied of the remaining tatters of
meaningful subjectivity, the gift of forgiveness must come unexpectedly, impossibly; it
must come from a lack and depletion not from fullness and overflowing of life. This is
why death, in this case, is almost necessary for the act of forgiveness. Let us turn to the
ends of both texts to work through the sordid scaffolding of this dark logic.
Renewal: Forgiveness without Judgment
In the final scene of Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov throws himself at Sonya’s feet
just outside the Siberian prison camp. With this act, forgiveness seems to suspend the
history of his misdeed, thereby allowing Sonya to recognize the motivations for his
crimes. This, in turn, allows Raskolnikov to be reborn as a new person. When the crime
is murder, the victim is no longer able to forgive. This then makes forgiveness
questionable, if not impossible. Yet even then, it is possible that a new self could be
forged and formed from the remaining tatters of the murderer’s cloak. Even if
forgiveness is not, re-birth is possible. At the same time, such re-birth is not the
complete erasure of the past. Instead, it is a working through the past so that the past is
fully inscribed in the present and the future. The past is never lost, but actually comes
to function as the material for the formation of the new self. Forgiveness, like
confession, cannot purify actions, but instead raises the motivations and convictions
undergirding actions so as to reformulate laws and forms of relations with others. This
renewal not only allows Dostoevsky to depict the unfolding of Raskolnikov’s
viciousness and despair but also allows Hegel to reveal the same about Spirit. Reading
Hegel’s categories into Crime and Punishment shows that the nature of forgiveness is
the same as the nature of aesthetic experience. Like an aesthetic experience,
forgiveness is amoral, ahistorical, and uneconomical in that is does not judge its object
in any determinate sense. Forgiveness does not judge what is and what is not the
correct criterion; it does not judge what is good and what is bad; it is not really a
determinative judgment at all. This is the condition of inscription and renewal. In the
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Phenomenology of Spirit, forgiveness, as the movement of conscience into absolute
Spirit, absorbs and transforms the suffering and evil of individual selves without moral
judgment.
This is why the movement of spirit, in Hegel, requires the patience and labor of the
negative, and we can now give this kind of patient labor another name: forgiveness.
Forgiveness, since it is not the routine reaction to a conscious or unconscious
confession, requires the working over of a loss or crime. This leads to what might be a
contestable claim: forgiveness is essential to the entirety of Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit. For the history that appears in that text is a history of loss, crime, transgression,
and sacrifice. In short, it is the long history of suffering loss. The same could be said
about Crime and Punishment. It is story of suffering and loss: the loss of a wager
(Raskolnikov asks, “am I an extraordinary or ordinary man?”), the loss of life (the
pawnbroker, her sister, Marmeladov, etc.), the loss of hope (Svidrigailov kills himself),
the loss of freedom (Raskolonikov’s penal punishment), etc. It is a story of patience and
labor over loss and negativity. Even the structure of the novel reflects this. After a short
pre-story, the narrative opens with a distinct act of negation, the negation of the
pawnbroker. It is only after this that the action truly begins. While the first chapter
depicts the crime, the remaining sections detail the long history of how the moral
community handles that first negation. Given all that we have said, it should be clear
that the remaining sections are about forgiveness. Both texts, then, are fundamentally
works of mourning and the creation of the community of those who have lost. And
what is the fundamental perspective of mourning? Contemplation, the very perspective
of absolute knowing.71
We now have a tentative definition of forgiveness: to forgive is not to forget but to
forge and form, to become conscious of the losses, crimes, and punishments that constitute
Spirit. Or as Hegel puts it, forgiveness “knows not only itself but also the negative of
itself, or its limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself.”72 Despite the
loss of the murder victims, the movement from morality-to-conscience-to-absolute
Spirit is the movement from a moral community to the re-birth of a new historical
community of the living and the dead through the simultaneous impossibility and
necessity of forgiveness. It is not until the final scene of the novel that Raskolnikov
truly confesses and recognizes his utter dependence on the other, that he truly empties
himself on to the lap of the angelic Sonya. The necessity of a final act of emptying of
the self might be one of the reasons why Dostoevsky adds the epilogue. Raskolnikov
“did not know that the new life would not be his for nothing, that it must be dearly
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bought, and paid for with the great and heroic struggles yet to come…But that is the
beginning of a new story, the story of the gradual renewal of man, of his gradual
regeneration, of his slow progress from one world to another, of how he learned to
know hitherto undreamed-of-reality. All that might be the subject of a new tale, but
our present one is ended.”73
Ryan Johnson
Elon College
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